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Evaluating

Reagan
Federalism

David B. Walker

Reagan federalism, unlike Reaganomics, has achieved far less than was anticipated in
1981. In this article, the extent of real change in the intergovernmental system is gauged by
assessing recent intergovernmental developments in light of the time perspective (1980,

1981,

and 1987);

the relative significance offederalism within the cluster of Reagan politi-

cal precepts; the interplay of key actors in the national policy process;
state

and local officials. Also highlighted are

and the views of

the reasons that national policy activism has

been reduced but not rolled back. Overall, contemporary

U. S.

federalism

is still found to

be a nation-centered one because of the strong centralizing currents in the judicial/regulatory and political/representational arenas. Yet it is also a somewhat less centripetal one

now than
cal,

it was in 1980, owing
and managerial spheres.

to

developments

Have Reagan federalism and
tally

that

in the intergovernmental Junctional, fis-

the recent massive federal budget deficits

fundamen-

changed the heavily centralized system of U.S. intergovernmental relations

emerged from 1964

to

1980? Before

this pivotal question is

answered, a brief expla-

nation of the core tenets of Reagan federalism and the historical context that helped shape

them is in order. Six separate objectives combine to constitute the Reagan federalism.
Most of these have been and are explicit administration goals. A couple, however (items 4
and 5), are more implicit and have to be inferred from policy proposals and actions.
1

A drastic reduction in the national intergovernmental role clearly is at the
center of Reagan's theory of federalism, and central to this

is

the need to

reduce the number of and dollars for federal grants-in-aid.

2.

Clearly related to the above

is

a belief in the need for a devolution of many

program responsibilities to state and local governments (and the
sometimes cited concomitant requirement to devolve the needed financial

federal

resources); in 1982, this basic goal was modified by the president's State of

David B. Walker, a professor ofpolitical science at the University of Connecticut previously served as assistant
director of the U. S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1966-84) and as staff director of the
,

U. S.

Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations (1963-66).
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the

Union "sorting out" proposal and its call for a federalization of Mediwhich tacitly conceded the need for a simultaneous process involving

caid,

centralization

3.

and devolution.

Deregulation was and
this involves

is

1

a third component theme in Reagan federalism;

curbing federal regulation of both the private sector and state

and local governments.
4.

A return to the traditional dualistic partnership involving the states and the
national government

was and

a clear, though less trumpeted, feature of

is

the president's federalism.

5.

A determined effort to abandon federal participation in multistate and
substate regional institutions

and programs

(deinstitutionalization)

a less

is

heralded but persistent objective of the administration.

6.

Finally,

Reagan federalism

in its

broadest strokes calls for a reduction in

the expansionist activities of all governments, not just the national.

These goals,

in effect,

amount to a

rejection of the rapidly centralizing course of U.S.

federalism that began in 1964 and lasted to 1978-80. During this period, the net growth

mergers and block grant consolidations)

(after

amounted

in the

to at least 300, with a total of 537 as of the

number of funded grant programs
end of 1980 2

;

in dollar terms, aid

outlays experienced a greater than ninefold increase (and a doubling in constant dollars

during the seventies). The traditional federal-state partnership approach was significantly
altered to include federal-local, federal-nonprofit,

and federal-state-local as well. The

percentage relationship of federal aid to state and local receipts from

from

17.9 percent in

1964

to 30.7 percent

own

sources rose

by 1980.

Programmatically, significant expansions occurred in such broad functional areas as
health, social services, education,

manpower, and community and regional development,

while the programs for natural resources, agriculture, and especially transportation aid

experienced proportionate declines. In terms of the scope of national policy concerns, a

wide range of governmental functions were included
be of state,

local, or

even private concern

bikeways, rat control, potholes, and the

that previously

(libraries, fire protection,

like). In addition,

a

new

were considered

to

policemen's pensions,

era of "social regula-

tion" was ushered in during these years, with historic enactments in the areas of equal
rights

and access, the environment, conservation, health and

safety,

and energy, produc-

ing a novel situation in which state and local governments served as both the objects of

and, frequently, the implementors of federal regulations. 3 Administratively, intergovern-

mental management in many of the new program areas assumed a cooptive, intrusive, and

sometimes arbitrary tone on the part of federal grant and regulatory administrators and a
confrontational,

if

not conniving, behavior on the part of many of the involved subnational

recipient governmental personnel.

By

the late seventies, the system had

making, yet was

still

become highly

centralized in terms of policy-

largely noncentralized in terms of actual implementation.

The

latter

gave rise to the impression in the minds of many that no basic change had occurred in the
system. Yet, crucial interlevel changes had occurred, probably the most drastic in this
century. Critics of these developments focused

22

on the national policy process,

its

heavy

interest-group basis in the seventies,
its

its

prolific

and ultimately costly policy outputs, and

panoramic pattern of implementation involving

at least

60,000 of the 82,000 units of

4
subnational governments and countless thousands of nonprofits. Questions of systemic

overload, administrative effectiveness, economic efficiency, basic equity, and account-

ability—both politically and administratively— were raised by most conservatives and

many

liberals.

At the same time, between 1960 and 1980, the poverty percentage was cut

in half,

and

weaker did not widen (as it might well
have, given the massive influx of new job applicants from the baby-boom generation).
Thirty million members were added to the national work force, in part because of the
the gap between the economically stronger and

federally stimulated expansion of the state/local governmental sector, Social Security

amendments that encouraged early retirement, and some, but not all, of the federal jobs
programs and expanded educational opportunities. Longer life expectancy and lower
child mortality rates were achieved, and a necessary revolution was achieved in civil
5

rights

and

civil liberties.

The Reagan

election in 1980, to a certain degree,

was a reaction

The advent of a

to these earlier

sionist policy

developments

dominated by

interest groups; of an ever centralizing national judiciary;

at the national level.

expan-

national policy process

and of a near

collapse of the national political parties, especially the ostensibly majority Democratic
Party, as effective brokers, mediators,

and

in

Congress (thanks

to populist

and conciliators of factions

reforms

to a collapse of various traditional policy constraints
that

was overarching

in its reach

in national conventions

had given

in both, in the early seventies)

and centralizing

and

to a national

rise

domestic agenda

in its basic policy thrusts.

From a prag-

matic perspective, the overall system was seen as overloaded, ineffective administratively,
inefficient economically, not sufficiently targeted

countable

politically.

6

To put

it

more

on equity

goals,

and basically unac-

simply, the federal system had

become dysfunc-

tional—out of balance operationally. 7 Reagan federalism then constituted a rejection of
all

of these trends. But

To arrive
requires

at

how

did

it

fare in practice?

well-founded judgments regarding the impact(s) of Reagan federalism

some awareness of the varying vantage points from which intergovernmental

developments since 1981 might be observed and assessed. At

come to mind:

least four

such perspectives

time; the president's overall agenda; nonpresidential key players; and state/

local governments.

The Time Factor
Time constitutes

a basic conditioner of how one assesses Reagan federalism.

1980, for example, few Washington observers

were possible. Efforts

felt that significant shifts in

to devolve, decentralize,

Back

in

the system

and curb the national government's do-

mestic agenda were generally viewed skeptically, given the heavily centralizing and expansionist tendencies then of the national policy process, dominated by interest groups, as

noted above. Yet, in the fall of 1981, just one year later, the chances for some real surgery
on the system seemed not only possible, but inevitable. The two historic legislative wins
for the president and his economic policies were the crucial intervening factors here. With
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), outlays for domestic programs
were reduced by $35 billion for FY 1982 and by up to $131 billion for FY 1984, and
grants for state and local governments were slashed even more severely. To complement
this cut in federal expenditures, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) reduced
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individual

income tax

rates

by 25 percent over a three-year period. These

cuts,

along with

incentives for personal savings and corporate investment, lowered federal revenues

$282
below what they would have been for 1982-84. 8 These Reaganomics victories
combined to suggest a future scenario of severe further cuts in federal grants, draconian
billion

reductions in the federal government's overall domestic role, rapid rises in defense and
foreign policy outlays, and real rollbacks in federal revenues. A range of domestic programs and the groups supporting them, along with the intergovernmental lobby, faced the

prospect of far

more punishing

actions in the years ahead than they had encountered in

1981.

From the vantage point of 1987,
ize.

Beginning in

FY

of course, this hairshirt horror show did not material-

1983, grant outlays gradually increased both in constant and current

dollar terms, though the annual rate of increase for
its

FY 1983-FY

1987 nowhere matched

own

counterpart of the mid-1970s, and, as a percentage of state-local receipts from

sources, federal aid totals declined from 31.7 percent in 1980 to 21.4 percent by 1986. 9 In
addition, while the

number of programs by 1984 was reduced

to

around 400 (from 537

in

1980), there was no wholesale withdrawal from any of the major newly entered into and
later

expanded program areas of the Johnson-Nixon-Ford years— save

for

some

in the

areas of housing and multistate and substate regional development.

The mounting budget deficits and
to set the scene

the doubling of the national debt since 1980 appeared

by the mid-eighties for a rerun of OBRA. Put

differently,

huge revenue losses caused by ERTA, the extraordinary jumps
Reagan's

first

by 1985, the

in defense outlays during

term, the failure of Congress to cut domestic outlays as drastically as

OBRA or the president called for, and the Reagan opposition to meaningful

"revenue

enhancements" (though he did sign three revenue-raising measures between 1982 and
1984) had created a political climate in which drastic action on the deficit seemed
necessary.

With the enactment of Gramm-Rudman (RL. 99-177)

in 1985,

some saw another draco-

nian drama about to unfold for domestic programs and for state and local governments.
Yet, with

its

thirteen "protected or semi-protected" safety net programs,

ing— if sequestrations

10

the even shar-

are required— of the fiscal pain between defense and the remaining

Congress

domestic programs should expe-

domestic programs, the near consensus

in

rience only modest further cuts and that

some tax hike was needed

that

suggested at the outset that this would not be acted out. For

FY

to avoid

1986 and

such cuts,

FY

1987,

Con-

gress ostensibly adhered to the deficit-reduction target goals set forth in the act. Yet, the
ultimate actual shortfalls were greater than Congress had stipulated. For
serious effort

was made by

either

Congress or the president

to reach the

FY

1988, no

$108

billion

deficit target.

The crumbling of Gramm-Rudman's
dent's failure to approve a tax hike

program

cuts called for by the

federalism achieved

was anticipated

original goals

is

the ultimate result of the presi-

and Congress's refusal

White House. From

more than could have been expected

in late 1981,

to accept the severe

domestic

the perspective of 1987, then,
in

Reagan

1980 but nowhere near what

thanks to the resurgence of effective lobbying by program-

matic and other domestic-interest groups, the reemergence of congressional assertiveness,

and the concomitant not-so-obvious decline

in presidential

domestic leadership.

Presidential Precepts

Another way

to evaluate

Reagan federalism

is

to assess

24

its

position and

power

in the presi-

dent's overall constellation of concepts

and commitments. The

political

creed of this pres-

ident, after all, has influenced the actions of this administration to a greater
that of most other recent presidents; hence,

it

deserves

some

scrutiny.

degree than

Moreover, and

again in contrast to most of his immediate predecessors, this president's philosophy ap-

pears clear, coherent, and internally consistent.

On closer examination,

separate precepts that constitute his personal political creed are not

mutually complementary.
his defense

11

however, the

all that

compatible or

Witness the disjuncture and discord present in the interplay of

and foreign policy stands; his pro-business concerns; his Moral Majority
his domestic retrenchment goals; his basic economic objectives; his per-

commitments;

more balanced, less centralized federal
The following brief analyses of each of these, save the last, will show that actions
and trends generated by efforts to carry them out have achieved far more centripetal
sonal pragmatism; and his faith in the need for a

system.

results than his federalist creed has

produced centrifugal consequences.

Defense Buildup

A strong defense and an assertive foreign policy have been prominent features of the president's basic belief

system for some time. Once he had been elected, a major acceleration

of the defense buildup that had begun during Carter's last two years was launched. This

form of national governmental activism, combined with the extraordinary tax cuts sanctioned by

ERTA,

put the squeeze on

many domestic programs and helped trigger the douNone of the defense-related actions

bling of the national debt over the past six years.

impacted federalism

directly, but the fallout

dollar terms through

FY

from mounting defense dollars

in constant

1986, far fewer tax dollars, and far greater debt payments, along

with a severe recession in 1982-83, certainly affected state and local governments and
congressional behavior to a far greater degree than Reagan federalism initiatives as such.

The president's defense policies,

then,

combined with

his no-new-taxes stance

and the

reluctance of Congress to cut deeply further into domestic programs, have produced the
largest budgets in our national fiscal history; a series of annual budgetary stalemates

resulting in extraordinary deficits; a static evolution in constant dollar terms for

most

federal grants-in-aid, but not for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid; and increased
state

and local lobbying involvement

in the national

budget process. These four outcomes

together have undercut the president's federalist goals of reduced governmental activism

and a major shrinking

in the size of the federal role in the federal system, as well as his

1980 economic goal of a balanced budget by 1984.

A new centralizing dynamic is a by-

product of these interrelated developments.

Business Concerns

The

state regulatory

and international competitive worries of U.S. business have resulted

in other centripetal actions.

Witness the many recent centralizing and preemptive actions

by Congress, the federal courts, and the federal executive branch, taken largely
behest of business interests, that

preempt varying

is,

state restrictions

at the

efforts to enact a national product liability law; to

on truck

uniform requirements; to raise the speed

length, width,

and weight and

limit; to accelerate offshore oil

to establish

and gas explora-

and to speed up the production of nuclear power. Many of these have ended (or
would have ended if successful— product liability legislation, accelerated offshore oil
tion;

exploration, speeded up nuclear

power production) what arguably are legitimate exercises

of states' police powers. Business rights, or at least those of the titans of interstate and
international trade, then rarely dovetail today with states' rights; the administration has
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not been unmindful of this distinction, and in the various areas cited above,

has favored

it

the centralizing positions of business. In terms of the president's federalism precepts, a

reduced federal
ties

were

all

role, deregulation, less activism,

undermined when these pro-business

and devolution of program responsibiliinitiatives

were successful. Moreover,

even when they failed (for example, the offshore exploration and nuclear-power expansion), the administration's efforts

and rhetoric made a mockery,

in state

and local eyes, of

concern for federalism.

its

Moral Majority Goals
The administration's support

for certain goals of the

Moral Majority

also has conflicted

with the president's federalism precepts. The high-priority items on the Moral Majority's

agenda ("pro-life," prayer, anti-pornography, "family values," and so on)
utilizing national

governmental actions

(a court decision, a statute, or

regulation or rule) to help achieve them.

The

all

involve

an administrative

religious right, unlike the fundamentalists of

a generation ago, ignores the separation of church and state and eagerly seeks out the politi-

and governmental arena(s), especially those in Washington, to promote its programs.
While the president has skillfully managed to stave off making the Moral Majority's full
agenda his own, the administration has responded to this constituency with powerful rhetoric and even with a few positive programs (the regulations that produced the Baby Doe
cal

case, the "teenage chastity" categorical grant, anti-abortion regulations,

some judicial

appointments, and efforts to give tax-exempt status to segregated denominational
schools).

12

The

noncentralizing, pluralistic values of federalism, especially Reagan feder-

alism, have not blended well with the moral certainties and the centralizing political
thrusts of the religious right.

Retrenchment Versus Deregulation

The

administration's domestic retrenchment goals constitute yet another area wherein

federalist values have

food stamps, and

been undercut. Efforts

produced an increase

tions for recipient state governments.

13

in constraining rules

and regula-

Later administration endeavors, though unsuccess-

mandate Workfare requirements

for three-quarters of all

would have produced a similar

recipients

its

mounting cost of Medicaid,

AFDC generated congressional (with OBRA) and administration

actions, beginning in 1981, that

ful, to

to rein in the

result.

AFDC and food stamp

These were and are

in

marked contrast to

the administration's goals of curbing other intergovernmental regulations and of administering the

new block grants

Budgetary, Deficit,

in a highly

and Tax

permissive fashion.

Objectives

In various ways, the administration's goals in these related areas also have overridden
directly or indirectly state
cies suggested.
levels of federal

The high

and

local concerns, as the earlier discussion of

its

defense poli-

federal taxes, soaring federal domestic expenditures, rising

borrowing, and increasing regulation of the seventies were viewed by

candidate Reagan in 1980 as developments that impeded business initiatives, greater productivity and competitiveness, and private investment— in short,

dynamic economic

growth. The Reagan election formula for an economic resurgence was comprised of much

lower taxes, significantly reduced domestic outlays, deregulation, and a balanced budget
(by 1984).

The dramatic budgetary and revenue responses to this problem of economic growth
OBRA and ERTA. With the president's initial 1981 budget proposals for FY 1982,

were

26

intergovernmental programs bore two-thirds of the $48.6 billion in domestic cuts that

were called

for.

OBRA provided for only a $35 billion reduction in domestic

Though

spending (but $131 billion by

FY

1984), grants-in-aid experienced far deeper slashes than

did other domestic programs, thanks in part to Social Security and a range of private sector subsidies being left largely intact. In addition, the

incorporated in
to a

OBRA,

advertised nine block grants

25 percent reduction from what the seventy-seven programs

received in

FY

1981.

As

and local governments
lays after

FY

will

fell

reflected primarily both

be explained

later, real

OBRA's

that

were merged had

spending for federal grants to

by only 8 percent for the period

FY

state

1981 -FY 1985, and this

severe impact and the modest growth in total grant out-

1982 (which the administration opposed).

As was noted

earlier,

ERTA was just as important to achieving the administration's

supply side economic policy goals. With
rates over three years

was

much

while helpful administratively to their state recipients, amounted

lost to the

its

25 percent reduction

in individual

and numerous corporate tax breaks, about $282 billion

income-tax

in

revenues

Treasury between 1982 and 1984. In combination, these two enactments set

much constrained national-policy development process (in terms of domesprogram growth and new domestic initiatives).
Some of the lost revenues were recaptured with the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) and the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), along with the
Social Security bailout and the Surface Transportation Act of 1982. The revenue-neutral
nature of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 did nothing to help solve this problem, though it did
the scene for a

tic

eliminate the deductibility of state and local sales taxes and personal property levies.

These

later

enactments could in no way compensate for the heavy growth in outlays for

defense and Social Security and the moderate hike in domestic expenditures; hence, the
soaring deficit challenge and the rapid rise in debt payments in the mid-eighties.

The combined effects of these

national budgetary, taxing, and deficit-increase actions

have been to reduce somewhat the federal role in domestic affairs— to a far greater degree
than the administration's federalism initiatives as such; to curb the expansionist policy

development process that prevailed from 1964

ments

to rely far less

on national solutions

to

to 1978; to force state

and

local govern-

some of their problems (which

they have

done); and to defeat the administration's (and others') goals of a balanced budget, less
overall governmental activism,
its

and a healthy balance of foreign

trade.

Moreover, despite

constraining character, this overriding fiscal development has exerted a centralizing

no state or local government can ignore
economic and intergovernmental consequences.
effect in the sense that

its

many

direct

and indirect

Personal Pragmatism
Finally, the president's political

pragmatism and personal reluctance to adhere rigidly to
must be considered here. For example, while the presi-

disruptive ideological goals also

dent has conveyed convincingly the continuing impression that he opposes tax hikes, the

record indicates that he has signed

TEFRA;

the Social Security Act

at least four revenue-raising

Amendments of 1983

Surface Transportation Act of 1982; and

DEFRA.

measures since 1982:

(P.L. 98-21: the "bailout"); the

Additionally, while Congress enacted

appropriations bills from 1982 to 1986 that exceeded his budget requests for federal aid to
states and localities, the president signed these measures apparently without major discomfort in most instances, though some had been reduced under the threat of veto. These

and other case studies suggest

that the president's

pragmatism and

dislike of sustained

confrontational politics sometimes have served to blunt his strong ideological commit-
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ments.
ities to

14

At times,

the states.

this

has meant a slowing of his drive to devolve powers and responsibil-

At other times,

it

has meant a willingness to favor

more powerful

pressure groups (business, populist, or Moral Majority), and sometimes this has undercut
state

and

local prerogatives.

A More Balanced Federalism: A
To sum up, federalism

is

creed, and

it

terms,

much more important

it is

Wavering Goal

one— but only one— of the tenets

frequently conflicts with and

is

in the president's political

undercut by other tenets. In operational

than so-called Moral Majority issues, but

matches the business, economic, defense, and

political

it

nowhere

pragmatic concerns of the presi-

dent and his administration. Reagan federalism's chief legislative wins occurred in 1981,
notably with

OBRA,

though

its

pro-state and local administrative actions have continued

His second State of the Union and

to the present.

its

near

total

preoccupation with the

grand restructuring of the federal system produced a tough and troubling debate between
governors and administration spokesmen throughout most of 1982, but no agreement or
constructive legacy.

Every Budget Message since then has called

for grant consolidations

and cutbacks

in

domestic programs in order to help promote the administration's ostensible prime domestic

goals of federal retrenchment and devolution. Yet Congress has ignored practically

of the various post- 1981 block-grant recommendations and has rejected

many

all

of the pro-

posed program cuts and eliminations, partially because White House lobbyists did not

push vigorously for them and
been reached with

partially

because most of the members

felt that

In short, the president's early crusade for a

more constrained

more commanding

issues

in political ascen-

and challenges. This by no means

is

suggest that his desire to rebalance the federal system has disappeared or that
deep. Too

many

localities (that

be cited

to

had

federal role in the federal

system frequently was shunted aside, even when the president seemed
dancy, by other

the limit

OBRA.

intended to
it

was never

other executive branch actions after 1981 that favored states and their

is,

in the grants

management, block

grant,

and some regulatory areas) can

demonstrate a continuing federalism focus. But the overall record does signify

his stronger

concern with defense, foreign

worries, and

it

affairs,

domestic retrenchment, and business

demonstrates that the unfolding of actual events over the past seven years,

along with his pragmatism, have only accentuated his preoccupations with these kinds of
issues.

Federalism no longer

Reagan concepts, but

Key

Players,

the bright star

one of the

it

was

in

1981-82 within the constellation of

stars.

Power Positions, and Models

Another angle from which
judgments on

is

it is still

it is

to

view the recent intergovernmental record and

to arrive at

quite opposite to this presidential one. Pluralist interpretations of the

American system usually contend

it

can be called) of

Reagan— is but one

factor condition-

that the personal philosophy (if

a president— even a popular and persuasive one, like

such

ing policy developments in a system as richly variegated, as frequently constraining, and
it behooves the careful analyst to gauge the changing compower positions of the numerous actors in the recent national decision process
and to probe the related phenomenon of which of the historic models of policy-making
predominated during the period 1981-87.

as accessible as ours. Hence,

parative

15
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Presidential

Government (1981)

From January
were

in

20, 1981, through the rest of that year, the president and the presidency

ascendancy. Thanks to Reagan's appeal, his electoral triumph, the unexpected

Republican capture of the Senate (for the

first

time since 1952), the carving out of an

ideological conservative majority in the nominally Democratic House, the general
cratic

Demo-

disarray— politically and ideologically— and popular expectations of change, the

specter from the 1970s of a near impotent presidency faded, and fairly rapidly at that.

The

historic

model of policy-making

for this relatively brief period

nian-crafted, hierarchic, presidentially centered and ascendant

nation had observed such a

phenomenon

was the Hamilto-

one— the

first

time the

since the tumultuous years of Lyndon Baines

Johnson, the Great Society, and the extraordinary 89th Congress. This

is

not to say that

Even in this prolonged presidential honeymoon period, the White House did not get exactly what it wanted in all instances. Witness how little the nine block grants that emerged within the Omnibus Budget
the president or his allies totally dominated policy-making.

Reconciliation Act resembled what the president's
All in

all,

ship—both
major

initial

seven called

in foreign

and domestic

affairs.

From

the intergovernmental angle, the only

occurred in that year:

legislative victories the administration has scored in this area

the one-time rollback of federal-aid expenditures (by
tion of

for.

however, few would deny that 1981 was a year of strong presidential leader-

more than $8

some sixty-odd programs— including most of the

billion); the elimina-

federal-multistate

economic

development and river basin commissions programs, the Intergovernmental Personnel

number of substate regional programs and incentives; the enactment of nine
block grants that involved the merger of some seventy-seven aid programs; and the tightAct, and a

ening of eligibility and other requirements for
achieved in 1981, primarily through

branch (David Stockman
tial

skillful

AFDC and Medicaid.

in particular) of the congressional

policy purposes and for circumventing the hostile

liberal

These

all

were

manipulation on the part of the executive

budget process for presiden-

House Hierarchs and dozens of

and other program lobbyists (but few private-sector subsidy advocates). This

was not

to

be repeated

in

feat

subsequent years.

A Pluralistic Policy Process (1982-87)
The second and third Reagan years witnessed the reemergence of a nonsupine Congress
and the passage of legislation such as TEFRA, the Surface Transportation Act of 1982,
and the Social Security bailout,

all

crafted primarily by congressional leaders.

tinuation of an absolute decline in federal aid, as

aid totals in

FY

and continued

1983 increased by more than $4 billion over the

to

grow

to the point in

over, in these years the president's
billion to

FY

FY

1986 where they exceeded $1 12

budget requests for

state

$13 billion below what he ultimately signed into

FY

1986 and

FY

Instead,

1982 low-level mark,
billion.

More-

and local aid ranged from $4

law. Presidential defense re-

quests increasingly encountered the opposite treatment, to the point

both

The con-

OBRA mandated, did not occur.

where Congress,

for

1987, actually held the defense budget to a steady level in constant

dollars. Yet the bigger intergovernmental issue here is the relative position of federal aid,

and

this position

has been and

is

a reduced one in terms of overall budget expenditures and

domestic outlays. Moreover, federal aid declined steadily from

FY

FY

1980 (30.4 percent)

to

1986 (20.6 percent) as a proportion of state-local general revenues, reflecting both

increased state-local outlays from
dollars.

own

sources and the very slow growth in federal grant

16
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What

mixed pattern of presidential and congressional initiatives and
significant role for Congress and domestic-interest groups in
national domestic policy-making and a curbing of the president's first-year, nearly unfetthis post- 1981,

rebuffs suggests

is

more

a

tered influence. This can be partially explained by the Democratic pickup of seats in 1982
(putting the Speaker back into clear control of the

25

licans to capture the necessary

to

30 seats

in

House) and by the

1984

that

failure of the Repubwould have permitted a return to

more is involved here than party and elecThe slackening off of congressional compliance with presidential

the earlier conservative coalition control. Yet,
toral political shifts.

wishes began, after

and

this

means

midstream

for

fiscal climate

all, in

1982

that attitudes

many members

generated by

(if

not with the Supplemental Appropriation late in 1981),

and votes on various domestic programs and on cuts changed
of the 97th Congress, though

OBRA, TEFRA,

The severe recession of 1982-83,

the

and the hikes

all

within the constrained

in defense.

growing bipartisan congressional consensus on

domestic program renewals (but not on appropriate funding
crease in successful lobbying activity (much of

it

levels),

and the marked

in-

by members of the intergovernmental

17
group, as with the Surface Transportation Act, the renewal of GRS in 1983, and the

maintenance

intact of both the

rect Action Grant)

Community Development Block Grant and

combined, beginning

in 1982, to help

further drastic cuts in federal aid. This development,

scrap the

the

Urban Di-

OBRA scenario of

when combined with

the skyrocket-

ing defense, Social Security, and Medicare outlays, explains the massive budget deficits of
the

Reagan years. All these program expansions also underscore the emergence of a heavi-

ly pluralistic, partially

pressure-group conditioned, mildly expansionist decision-making

process in the domestic program area.

While somewhat differently constituted and much more
of the seventies, this system was and
as

its

is,

in

deficit conscious than

its sister

terms of overall expenditure, as "out of hand"

predecessor ever was, producing far larger budgets and far bigger deficits in 1982-

many key actors, internal and external, as did the short-lived 1981 process— if not more— but fewer than that of the prior decade. This relative reduction in the
number of players was not from a lack of eager potential players but stemmed from the
emergence of a few pieces— sometimes only one piece— of massive omnibus legislation in
87. It involved as

any one session as the focal point of congressional, presidential, and pressure group attention

and action. The prime

were and are the

six

ory, the authorizing

legislative players in this procedurally

circumscribed setting

money committees of the Congress. For the first time in living mem(substantive) committees and their members were relegated largely to

a secondary role.

Programmatic By-products
This latest version of the Madisonian pluralistic, pressure-group conditioned, concessional model of policy-making helped produce the most critical peacetime deficit crisis
ever. Yet it also produced a very different version of federalism than the one reflected in
the president's 1981 goals of reducing federal aid, delegating federal grant programs,

ending or curbing federal intergovernmental regulation, and eliminating federal multistate

and substate regional

initiatives. Implicit in the

and the Congress from 1982
did not forsake

all

to

combined actions of the president

1987 was an approximation of a theory of federalism that

the concerns of congressional federalism of the seventies.

The

18

earlier incrementalism was replaced in part by a combined decremental/incremenapproach wherein some programs, usually small and not too important, were eliminated; the larger and more popular ones were continued, sometimes with funding hikes;
tal
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were renewed but at static funding levels. Dramatic program initiatives in any
were generally resisted after 1981, though 1987 witnessed proposals for welfare
reform, catastrophic illness coverage, worker retraining, and aid for the homeless, either
and the

rest

direction

from the president or Congress, or both.

The confrontational character of Congress's

earlier

approach

to federalism

reemerged

wholly intact in 1982 and grew stronger as time elapsed. The administration's

calls for

ever deeper domestic and, especially, intergovernmental program cuts were simply re-

The procurement practices of defense came under heavy bipartisan fire, and the
growing number of those in poverty became known and a cause of some alarm. Congress

jected.

19

for six years

now has

almost wholesale fashion rejected the president's budgets, even as

in

a point of departure for debate on most items, though his target figure for overall spending

always has been honored until now, or even cut a

dence and leadership have worked generally

bit.

This growing congressional indepen-

to sustain federal aid

programs

some

in

form, to maintain a fairly expansive federal-program agenda ("deficit politics" permit-

assume a more empathetic stance than that of the president regarding state and
and to treat most federal political executives with considerable skepticism,

ting), to

local worries,
if

not scorn.

Congress's habitual preference for narrowly defined and heavily conditional categoricals also continues to manifest itself.
to less than

400 from an

seem

still

all

Carter's last year (79.3 percent),

1986.

to

Not

to

number of categoricals by 1982

them; on the face of it,

21

would appear

some of the housing programs),

was larger

and

this

in

that general

FY

that the

1986 (81.4 percent) than

it

was

in

revenue sharing was terminated in

be overlooked are various signs of congressional skepticism regarding

by the administration

be

to

the major categoricals of the Johnson-Nixon period

operational (save for the regional and

categorical proportion of federal aid

forts

in the

to conflict with Congress's predilection for categori-

and the conditions attached

the case. However, note that nearly

are

The decline

all-time high of 534 in 1980, along with the advent of 13 block

grants (12 of them new), would
cal grants

20

ef-

to loosen categorical conditions, or signs of congressional

willingness to slap on additional regulations and directives.

22

This current congressional approach to intergovernmental relations— and
before the Democratic recapturing of the Congress in

1986— clearly

it

began well

contrasts with the

approach of the administration. Since both approaches are being partially applied, some
confusion about the future course of the system inevitably arises— a dilemma that frequently occurs

when

the predominant operational

model

is

a Madisonian pluralistic one.

The Outlook from Below
Yet another position from which to view and assess current intergovernmental develop-

ments

is

that of state

and local governments. Reagan federalism's greatest impact on these

partners in the system has been an attitudinal one. In fact,
lutionary dimension to

its

impact,

it

if

there has been any truly revo-

has been the shift in state and local attitudes.

longer do their officials rely on the national government to assist

many

of their toughest challenges. Instead, they

now

rely

in, if

more on

No

not actually solve,

self-help

and other

forms of intergovernmental collaboration, while not ignoring the continuing financial,
regulatory, programmatic, and legal roles that

In

more
1.

specific terms, state

Thus

far,

and

Washington continues

local officials have

the cuts in federal aid for

to

assume.

found the following to be true:

most of their jurisdictions have not been
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severe, but cities

all that

and counties

that relied heavily

on such aid

(as of

1980) have experienced disproportionately heavy rollbacks, and the overall
10 percent drop in federal aid's proportion of state-local receipts from

1980

to

1986 has confronted many jurisdictions with some

fiscal

head-

aches.

2.

While federal deregulation efforts have been helpful in the developmental
and block grant areas, they have been less apparent to state officials in
welfare and other social categorical programs, 23 and Congress and the
Court seem still to march to the drum of "continue the conditions."

3.

Where devolution of program administration has

occurred, most states

have picked up the responsibility one way or another; witness their generally good-to-excellent handling of the

new block grants;

assumption

their

(save for two) of the substate regional supervisory role under Executive

Order 12372; their extra funding of certain aid programs that experienced
federal cuts; and their continuation of some of the multistate regional
undertakings without Washington's participation. 24

4.

Despite the strong preference for an exclusive federal-state partnership in

Reagan federalism, and despite the singular reliance on the

states as imple-

mentors of all the new block grants, the "bypassing" of state governments
continues at only a slightly reduced rate, having dropped from 23.1 per-

The elimination of general revenue
The 1981-85
provided some psychic comfort to cities and

cent in 1980 to 21.6 percent in 1984.

sharing, however, will cut the bypassing figures for 1987.
direct federal aid to localities

counties, though

it

undercut the president's

was a source of some
5.

Those

hit

irritation to

some

own

recipient preferences

and

state officials.

hardest by the cuts of 1981 and

some

later

ones were the "work-

ing poor," nonprofit organizations in the social services and related areas,

and those urban and rural general units of government which have servicing overburdens and revenue shortfalls.

6.

The recession of 1982-83, those
and the

later deficit crisis,

fected states and

many

most

25

national actions
state

localities far

and local

more

which helped deepen

officials

would agree,

it,

af-

heavily than did Reagan federal-

ism; furthermore, various federal court decisions have had as

impact (usually negative and especially on the nation's

much

of an

localities) as the

president's intergovernmental initiatives.

7.

Finally,

Gramm-Rudman's

scenario (RL. 99-177) of exempting thirteen

"safety net" programs from any automatic cuts

26

and of equally sharing

any required rollbacks between defense and the remaining domestic pro-

grams

is

one

that

most

state-local officials prefer to the "dig

domestics" alternative contained

Most of these

state

deep

into the

in all of the president's recent budgets.

and local impacts, responses, actions, and anxieties

32

relate directly to

from Reagan's intergovernmental

the fallout
ers')

stem from his (and oth-

policies, but others

budgetary and revenue stands. Equally significant in any assessment of these juris-

on recent federal intergovernmental and other actions are their
on subnational governments. In general, these effects have tended to

dictions' perspectives

indirect effects

strengthen and even accelerate continuing state-local trends.

A major indirect consequence of Washington's downplaying of its intergovernmental
role, for

example, has been further enhancement of the

states' pivotal functional role in

Thanks to diverse federal actions that began in the sixties, the states
during the seventies took on the vital roles of chief planner, actual administrator, and
major implementor of nearly all the major federal domestic programs and intergovernmental regulatory policies enacted in the pre-Reagan period. The net effect of federal
the overall system.

cutbacks, deregulation,

program eliminations, the drag of the

deficit

on policy growth,

and certain court cases (notably those related to municipal antitrust and tort liability), and
of local and popular reactions to these and other threatening challenges, has been to ex-

pand the

states' operational role in the

system during the eighties. In the areas of the envi-

ronment, education reform and finance, economic development (including foreign trade),
physical infrastructure, and aid to local government, most states

assumed

significantly

greater responsibilities.

By

1980, the states also had again

in their

own

become

significant sources of

new

policy initiatives

consumer protection, educational finance and reform,
economic development, and so on). The remarkable renaissance of

right (for example,

health-cost controls,

this historic state role

was prompted by a combination of local pressures; various of the
which has

earlier federal actions cited above; the transformation of state political systems,

rendered them far more accessible and responsive; and the advent generally, but not uniformly, of much stronger state finances. All these dynamics of change served to revive the
states' traditional function

of serving as a prime arena in which their respective citizenries

could express some of their policy preferences in a range of key areas.

The range of these areas
political processes

inclusive.

These

clearly has

narrowed during the past half century. Yet

have never been more open, and

political

state electorates

changes (triggered largely by federal actions, chiefly the Voting

Rights Act of 1966 and the reapportionment decisions of 1962 and 1965) and the
significant scope of the states' police, fiscal,
tion of the states' policy-making role.

enon, and the

state

have never been more

states' policy actions,

They

and other powers help explain the

also suggest that this

is

still

revitaliza-

no transitory phenom-

both in response to and wholly independent of Reagan

federalism policies and the national government's deficit difficulties, only confirm this
suggestion.

By

1980, then, the states were performing two fundamental functions— they were serv-

ing as the system's prime

middleman manager and

as an arena (not the arena) in

their differentiated citizenries could register their policy preferences
initiatives.

in

During the subsequent seven years, the

states' individual

performing both these roles were to stand the system

concern with both roles were needed, after
sion of 1982-83; static federal aid growth;

all, to

in

good

cope with

which

and prompt novel

and collective vigor

stead. Capacity in

OBRA and ERTA;

some formal and some informal

and

the reces-

devolutions;

the specter of Gramm-Rudman; and the constrained national policy climate generated by
"deficit politics."

Some would

say

it

was providential

that the states

were prepared by

1981 to take on the challenges of this decade.

Another side effect of Reagan federalism has been the acceleration of certain earlier
local

governmental trends and the occasional triggering of some new ones.

33
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on the part of cities and counties to rely on various
services— joint powers agreements,
interlocal contracts, and transfers of functions. The seventies witnessed a steady increase
in the use of these devices, and the early eighties have seen an even greater reliance on
them as a means of overcoming interlocal jurisdictional fragmentation and of providing a
former

is

the increasing willingness

interlocal collaborative approaches to providing

more cheaply. 27

service

special districts

A long-term local governmental trend— the increasing use of

and authorities

for rendering public

services— also has been enhanced by

these districts' proven capacity to provide services that transcend local boundaries and by
their appeal in the eighties to those (including the administration)

who want more services

funded on a "user charge" basis. 28

A new development in local government is the different role of and changing attitudes
toward areawide Councils of Governments (COGs), comprised chiefly of elected local
office-holders.

29

As

a result of partial federal withdrawal from the substate regional

COGs were forced to rethink their functions,

scene,

and

their local constituents

forced to reassess their earlier, frequently skeptical attitudes. Out of this
fiscal support

more COGs

and a new mix of COG

activities.

were

came more

local

Clearinghouse efforts continued, but

participated in interlocal servicing contracts and even in acting as recipients

of functional transfers,
local reliance.

30

all in

a general spirit of greater entrepreneurialism and of state-

Another new, but by no means major, trend

willingness— especially in the eighties— of more
sion of a public function.

in local

localities to rely

government

is

the

on private-sector provi-

Of the many approaches, contracts have been the most favored
And while these private-sector alternatives nowhere

device, followed by franchises.

match the popularity of the

31

interlocal governmental options,

what evidence there

is

indi-

cates an increase in their usage in the eighties. This growing willingness to experiment

with a variety of indirect approaches to the provision of services suggests a degree of

among

flexibility

local

government

officials that

few would have deemed possible even

ten years ago.

The whole realm of state-local

relations

is,

of course, a third and final subnational gov-

ernmental area wherein the indirect effects of recent Washington intergovernmental and
other policy actions have manifested themselves. Even in the above primarily local

spheres of action, permissive state legislation

such local
relations,

is

required, and,

many

in the eighties.

earlier trends also

when

it is

not granted,

primary arena of intergovernmental

initiatives generally are barred. In this

were strengthened and a few new ones began

to

emerge

32

The themes of this revitalized state-local partnership were and are greater interdepenmore assertive state leadership, and a greater centralization of policy-making.

dence,

Beginning

moved

to

1.

in the late sixties

and continuing through the seventies

to

now, states have

accomplish the following:

Facilitate interlocal

and other servicing

tions, local-private servicing contracts,

shifts (especially transfers of func-

and

state

pickup of nonfederal

responsibilities in welfare programs).

2.

Broaden somewhat the revenue bases of local governments, with twentynow authorizing local sales taxes and thirteen, income levies for

nine states

certain localities, along with thirty-one sanctioning local tax increment

financing (compared to twenty in 1980).

34

Establish enterprise zone programs in nearly twenty-five states, chiefly

3.

for the benefit of distressed

communities.

Increase and better target the funding of primary and secondary educa-

4.

tion.

33

Provide for reimbursement of state mandates (now required in nineteen

5.

with nearly half of these acting in the eighties).

states,

Improve, through a variety of ways, access of localities to credit markets,

6.

with some twenty-six states enacting such measures between 1980 and
1983.

34

These and other

state initiatives

have helped to make state-local relations "more inten-

more involved" than they have ever been. 35 They also have
rendered these relations more constructive and more genuinely collaborative, though with
some greater centralization in many instances. Despite these generally positive developments, current state-local relations are not without conflict and contention. Were these
absent, nirvana indeed would have arrived at the subnational governmental levels! The
sive,

more

interdependent, and

recent decline in noneducational state aid, the
in

most

still

predominant position of property taxes

local revenue packages, the continuing presence of local tax

(in thirty-nine states),

and the failure of most

and expenditure

states to assist their localities

on

lids

either the

liability front are but a few of the foremost items of unfinished
on the agendas of many municipal leagues and county associations.
At the same time, from the state viewpoint some of these actions reflect or are condi-

municipal antitrust or tort
state business

tioned by various statewide policy concerns stemming from their

more

activist stance as

revenue raisers, policy innovators, financiers, regulators, and implementors of their
as well as federal programs.

A more genuine state-local partnership,

the eighties— thanks in part to

mental

initiatives,

and

some of the

then, has

own

emerged

in

side effects of Washington's recent intergovern-

deficit difficulties. This

development

is

not a

new

one, but rather a

strengthening of a firm trend that dates back at least to the sixties. In this revitalized collaboration, there are

still

elements of some conflict and, quite clearly, some tendencies to

centralize certain policy decisions at the state level.

Current Conclusions
Having probed Reagan federalism and
periods of time,
action agenda,
effect

on

state

basic ones

1. It

its

its

its

impacts from the perspectives of varying recent

place in the president's personal philosophy and the administration's

treatment by other key actors in the national policy process, and

and local

emerge from

officials,

this analysis, as follows.

can safely be stated that the Reagan years have produced some changes

tem—notably,

in

more

its

we can now ask what conclusions can be drawn. Three

pessimistic attitudes and

in the sys-

more modest expectations regarding

the

capacity of the national government to maintain an expansive domestic role, and in the
increasing reliance of both the national and local governments on the states to shore up the

system. This does not

mean

there are no continuities with the past; too

35

many

signs exist
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nationally of linkages with the seventies, if not the sixties, to reach this conclusion— for

example, an assertive Congress, a
groups, and a no clearer idea

now

powerful array of generally centralizing interest

still

as to

what the federal role

is

or should be in the federal

system than in 1980. The essential reasons for the basic changes, however, have more to

do with the

from Reaganomics

fallout

(direct

and

indirect), the doubling of the national

debt since 1981, and the results of these developments, than with the president's or any-

body
2.

else's purely

intergovernmental

initiatives.

For some, the implications of the above inevitably lead

to a

more decentralized,

devolved system, in that a de facto shedding of national responsibilities
the stringent shape of the federal fisc. But does this follow?

is

necessitated by

A focusing on federal aid

figures since 1981 might warrant this assertion, though even these indicate no rapid retreat

from program area

nature of aid, the

after

program

area. Moreover,

when the heavily

resilient strength of regulatory federalism,

still

conditional

and the continuing pre-

emptive propensities of Congress (and centralizing thrust of the federal courts) are recalled,

any sweeping announcement of the advent of a new, decentralized federalism

would be greeted by

state

and local

officials

and by close observers of the Washington

somewhat less
more confined
dilemma and partially to

scene with a hoot of derisive laughter. Nonetheless, the system today
centripetal than

was

it

is

in 1980, thanks again (but only partially) to the

policy process resulting

from the national government's

deficit

the expansion of the states' functional role in the system.
3.

a bit more balanced and somewhat more
when various authorities were trumpeting its
imbalances and dysfunctionalities. This generalization requires some

Following from the above, the system

functional today than

alleged interlevel

explanation, since

it

ments now occupy
in a federal

it

was

involves the relative positions of power which the subnational govern-

in the system,

compared

ments. At the very
political,

least,

it

more

to those of seven years or

regime signifies roughly equal weight or power— in

policy-making, and constitutional judicial

by

is

in the seventies,

terms— for the

ago. Balance

political, operational,

central

and constituent govern-

should signify a capacity on the part of the

latter units to assert

formal representational, operational and/or judicial means an authoritative

role in national governmental actions that affect their jurisdictional and operational integrity,

as in the

West German federal system. There are three primary arenas then, where

balancing acts

may

or

may

not occur.

In the area of operational federalism (that

is,

the funding, managing, and actual imple-

mentation of intergovernmental programs), the national government's role
but not as overarching as

it

was

in 1980.

in the length of its intergovernmental

fiscal contribution to the overall

Some of the

is still

strong,

signs of this are the slight reduction

program agenda;

the proportionate decline in

its

funding of aided programs; the slash in the number of

grant recipients— especially local ones; the loosening up of some conditions in

some

intergovernmental program areas— notably the nonsocial; and for the block grant and

some environmental programs, a devolution of greater grant management
ties.

Another sign

is

responsibili-

the assumption by the subnational governments, especially the states,

of a somewhat greater operational role, in part as a result of the above and in part because
of their

own greater

fiscal efforts in

policy initiatives (especially in
frastructure,

many

instances and independent

new or expanded

the fields of education, the environment, the physical

and consumer protection). These developments suggest a

to the states, but not to the extent of seriously undercutting the national

policy ascendancy in a range of key programs and regulatory areas.
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slight

tilt

in

in-

power

government's

,

In terms of operational effectiveness of the intergovernmental system, these federal

some slackening
somewhat fewer conditions and
in some cases, as well as more

devolutionary and independent state initiatives have combined to produce
off in the level of its pre- 1981 dysfunctionality. After
regulations, fewer partners,

and even fewer aid

all,

dollars,

independent subnational governmental actions and funding decisions, constitute a measure, albeit small, of interlevel decentralization
lier

programmatic, administrative, and

and of some reduction

in the system's ear-

fiscal overload.

In the judicial/regulatory area, however, the federal government's authority seems only
to expand.

Witness the generally centripetal thrust of most of the recent decisions relating

to the interstate

105

S. Ct.

commerce power

(notably Garcia

v.

San Antonio Metropolitan

Transit:

1005), the conditional spending power, and the reach of the Fourteenth

Amend-

ment. Note also that there has been no real rollback in the aggressive intergovernmental
regulatory role of the national government. All three branches of the central government

have contributed to

this

development, and their regulatory as well as preemptive actions

have significantly compromised the subnational governments' discretion in the opera-

realm and even

tional

do not involve aid

in areas that

dollars.

In the third broad field wherein contemporary federalism

is

shaped— the political/

representational— no fundamental shifts have occurred over the past half dozen years to

warrant the assertion that the intergovernmental lobby
than

it

was

and local

is

stronger in Washington, D.C.

in the seventies or that, in national party deliberations, the role of elected state

officials has returned to the ascendant status that

it

possessed from the 1830s to

the mid-1960s. National party units for the first time in our history are as authoritative as

and local ones,

state

if

not

more

so.

36

"Procedural reform and judicial intervention have

resulted ... in federalization, not hierarchical nationalization," explains one authority

on

37

The Republicans, according to Leon Epstein, "have nationalized their
party effort by a method analogous to the federal government's grant-in-aid system." 38
the Democrats.

Thus, the balance of power between the national and

away from the

earlier, heavily decentralized party

At the same time, both the national and

state parties

system.

has shifted dramatically

39

state/local parties have

had

to redefine their

roles in light of extraordinary changes in the political environment: technological, notably

communications and media

in the

fields; legal,

with continued state and increasing fed-

eral regulation of party activities; attitudinal, that

ment

to the parties

and the marked increase

electoral, for example,

ing;

fundamental

shifts in

40

Moreover, the parties have

the severe decline in citizen

campaign techniques,

and representational, with the explosion

sure groups.

is,

in fractionalization of the

lost

in the

body

strategies,

number, types, and

many of their earlier

commit-

politic;

and fund-

activities of pres-

functions to the media,

pressure groups, PACs, private consultants, and pollsters. 41 In representational terms,
before Congress, national administrative bodies, and the Supreme Court, the states, localities,

and

their

spokespersons have— since the 1970s— been treated more like one more

category of interest group than as
tutional federal system.

vital, functional

From this three-factor approach
final

judgment

that the

system

to assessing interlevel

still is

etal thrusts in the judicial/regulatory

somewhat

governmental components of a consti-

42

less nation-centered than

power

relations

a nation-centered one, given

its still

and political/representational

it

was

in 1980,

comes, then, the
strongly centrip-

test areas. Yet,

it is

because of the more ambivalent nature

of recent developments in the realm of actual operations. These latter developments also

provide the basis for the claim that the system overall
it

was

in the seventies.
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is

somewhat

less dysfunctional than

New England Journal of Public Policy

The Future
What do

The present

these current conclusions suggest for the future of U.S. federalism?

system has been aptly dubbed by Michael D. Reagan as a "permissive federalism,"

whereby the

"states' share" of power

and authority "rests upon the permission and per-

missiveness of the national government." 43 This dominant permissive
rary federalism, however,

an affront to most

is

state

and local

trait

officials

constitutional federalism. Hence, the tendency of such groups to

of contempo-

and

to

defenders of

ponder those current

developments which might lead to a more balanced intergovernmental system and to chart
possible future trends that would lead to a federalism that

is

more firmly rooted in genumore federally

ine interlevel cooperation, rather than unilateral national cooptations; in a
(territorially) structured political

one; and in

system rather than a national interest-group dominated

Supreme Court decisions

tional spending

that provide

powers of Congress and

parameters to the commerce and condi-

that recognize the transformed characters of

today's states and localities— a transformation that the Court itself helped bring about.

Some

observers, including the president, the attorney general, and various legal

scholars, see an evolving legal scenario that could help shore
judicial federalism.

By

up the

fragile foundations of

1988, the president will have appointed over half the

members of

the federal judiciary and, for the first time, will have a conservative majority

preme Court. From
result

change

their localities.

their earlier basic positions

(federalism being one of them) which

Another future scenario
is

to the constituent

However, the capacity of Supreme Court justices

is

govern-

to evolve

and

and the cluster of sometimes conflicting values

may comprise

a juridically conservative creed stand

as two major notes of caution about future actions of such a

already

on the Su-

according to the script, a series of decisions could over time

which would provide greater constitutional protection

ments and
to

this,

Supreme Court.

a continuation of the current national deficit drama, which

producing a "de facto federalism" involving a very gradual peeling off of some

federal domestic responsibilities to subnational governments and the private sector.

Cutting spending and programs, raising taxes, or doing both are
policy options for those

who

still

seek to deal with this dilemma. Yet,

if

the basic national

the

quences here and abroad of the deficit are not understood any better

44

economic conse-

in the future than

they are now, then the present charade of puny parings back and of major executive

branch-congressional confrontations over a pigmy revenue-raising package of $20 billion
will continue,

and the currently constrained but not closed national policy process

and international economic conditions

linger on. If future domestic
cally

reflect

will

more dramati-

and disastrously the dire consequences of our seemingly insatiable propensity na-

tionally to

borrow big and

version of the deficit
eral fiscal

blatantly, then a different,

drama

will

probably

much more draconian

be staged. Under either of these options, a reduced fed-

and programmatic role would

result;

with the second option, such a role proba-

bly would have severe, subnational governmental consequences in terms of added

operational responsibilities. But neither of these fiscal scenarios,

would do anything

to rein in the national

it

should be stressed,

government's interventionist regulatory and

judicial roles.

Both the judicial and

promise of some measure of realization, but
which occurred over the past twenty years and

fiscal scenarios hold

the nationalization of the political process

the centralizing propensities of dominant interests in both the national parties are not
likely to

be overturned

These conflicting

in the

years immediately ahead.

forecasts, then, suggest that in overall systemic terms U.S. federalism
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..

for the rest of the century will probably be a

do not

indicate, however, that

it

will

little

less nation-centered than

is

it

be a more cooperative federalism. Such a

now. They

shift

would

involve an authoritative state-local role in national policy-making and in operational matters, as well as a preferential jurisdictional

which are heard by the Supreme Court.

standing in cases involving these jurisdictions
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